Searching for equilibrium positions in a game of political competition with restrictions by Abellanas Oar, Manuel et al.
Searching for equilibrium positions in a game of political competition 
with restrictions 
Manuel Abellanas3, Ma Dolores Lópezb*, Javier Rodrigoc 
a
 Departamento de Matemática Aplicada de la Facultad de Informática, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, Spain 
b
 Departamento de Matemática Aplicada de la E.T.S.I. Caminos, Canales y Puertos, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, Spain 
c
 Departamento de Matemática Aplicada, E.T.S. de Ingeniería. Universidad Pontificia Comillas de Madrid, Spain 
A B S T R A C T 
This paper considers a problem of political economy in which a Nash equilibrium study is performed in a 
proposed game with restrictions where the two major parties in a country vary their position within a 
politically flexible framework to increase their number of voters. The model as presented fits the reality 
of many countries. Moreover, it avoids the uniqueness of equilibrium positions. The problem is stated and 
solved from a geometric point of view. 
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1. Introduction 
Politics and governance consist not only in managing well, but 
also in generating strategies. Strategic planning of processes and 
political change calis for a rigorous analysis of the current situa-
tion, a clear definition of adversaries and supporters, and a precise 
analysis of power relations. In politics, when it comes to strategic 
action, tactical behavior and short-term action still prevail. For 
long-term conceptualization, implementing policies, and conduct-
ing campaigns, strategic planning is essential to achieve lasting 
success. Thus, political parties shape and vary their proposals with-
in certain limits. These proposals are more relevant when they deal 
with issues in which citizens are especially interested during a cer-
tain period. 
The aim of this study is to find equilibrium strategies to be fol-
lowed by the two major parties of a country (government and 
opposition), enabling them to tune their proposals to a certain ex-
tent. Specifically, the Nash equilibrium study is proposed in a var-
iation of the political competition game with neighborhood 
restrictions, as proposed by the authors in Abellanas et al. (2006). 
The variation proposed in this work is focused on the consideration 
of neighborhoods for both parties who try to win the máximum 
number of voters. Thus, the movements of the opposing parties, 
p and q, are restricted by two sepárate circular neighborhoods 
B = C(x0,r), B' = C(xi,r'), where C(x,R) is the circle with center 
x and radius R, which guarantee that both parties cannot adopt 
the same political strategies. This is important because it avoids 
undesirable equilibrium positions of the form (t, t) and also en-
sures that the parties do not deviate too much from their central 
ideological positions x0,X], resulting in a more "partisan" outlining 
of the game than the Downs game considered, for example, in Roe-
mer (2001) and Lillo et al. (2007), where the parties are interested 
only in obtaining office. 
The Nash equilibrium has been studied as a general model of 
competition. It was first stated by Nash in his dissertation Non-
cooperative games (Nash, 1951) as a way to obtain an optimum 
strategy for games with two or more players. Plott (1967), Kramer 
(1973), McKelvey (1976), and others have shown that pure-strat-
egy Nash equilibria generally do not exist when competition takes 
place in a space of more than one dimensión. 
Various approaches to search for a resolution to this situation 
have been reported in the literature, including mixed-strategy 
equilibria, uncovered sets, probabilistic voting, and valence crite-
ria. See for example (Laver and Shepsle, 1996, McKelvey, 1976, 
1986, Enelow and Hinich, 1982, Lodregan and Romer, 1993, Anso-
labehere and Snyder, 2000, Banks and Sundaram, 1993, and Hinich 
and Munger, 1995). 
This work presents a discrete model of competition where 
examples with an infinite number of equilibrium positions are pre-
sented. The model can therefore be seen as an improvement on the 
classical games used in political economy. Due to the discrete nat-
ure of the presented game, the approach is developed using geo-
metric techniques. 
A simpler versión of the model has already been dealt with in 
previous work (Abellanas et al., 2006), but has now been adapted 
to reflect better the reality of many countries. Both competing par-
ties that constitute the major parties of a country are allowed to al-
ter their political positions on two Ítems especially relevant for the 
citizens to obtain more followers. As for the choice of these two 
items, studying pre-election surveys can provide relevant informa-
tion. To give an example, the problem of terrorism and questions 
related to immigration have recently become of immediate con-
cern to the citizens of Spain. This became apparent in surveys car-
ried out before the last elections. It should be noted that the 
authors do not consider that these two topics were decisive in 
the overall result of the elections, but that they can be important 
enough to deserve policy study by the parties. 
Apart from these considerations, the most relevant contribution 
of this study as compared to previous work by the same authors is 
the investigation of the equilibrium in the proposed game. 
The article is structured as follows: 
Section 2 introduces the problem and develops the mathemat-
ical model with emphasis on its geometric analysis. In Section 3, 
necessary and sufficient conditions are presented for the equilib-
rium position to exist. Several practical examples are given which 
¡Ilústrate various possibilities for equilibrium. 
2. The model 
In this work, the authors generalize the study of Nash equilib-
rium in a political-competition game that can be interpreted as a 
discrete versión of the Downs game (Downs, 1957; Roemer, 
2001). This game is defined on a two-dimensional space where 
each point represents a different political position. The two players 
of the game represent political parties that choose their positions 
in the plañe so as to attract the largest possible number of voters. 
The voters are represented by n fixed points on the plañe. 
It is assumed here that each player captures the points that lie 
closer to his position than to the other player's position. The perpen-
dicular bisector of the line joining the players' locations thus parti-
tions the plañe into two different voting regions. Each player wins 
the points in his own half-plane, and the winner will be the player 
whose región contains more points (Serra and Revelle, 1994; Smid, 
1997; Aurenhammer and Klein, 2000; Okabe et al., 2000). 
The players are two parties denoted by p and q. Their locations 
in the policy plañe are denoted by U,t2, determined by the policies 
they offer. All the political positions appearing in the voter popula-
tion are represented by a finite set of types H = {p-l,... ,p„} c R2 
(Roemer, 2001; Abellanas et al., 2006). 
Voter preferences over the issue space are Euclidean, so the 
payoff functions in the game as presented are given by: 
i r^ t i , f2) = number of points p¡ such that d(p¡, ti) < d(p¡, t2), 
n 2 ( í i , f2) = number of points p¡ such that d(p¡, ti) > d(p¡, t2) 
= n - n 1 ( t i , t 2 ) , 
where d{t,p¡) is the Euclidean distance between policy t and posi-
tion p¡. 
Both parties, p and q, will be allowed to vary their position with-
in a neighborhood; that is, the movements of the opposing parties 
with initial positions x0,x-¡ are restricted by two sepárate circular 
neighborhoods, B = B(x0, r), Bi = B(x-¡, ri). One way of guaranteeing 
this restriction is by assigning nuil gains to each of them if they 
move outside their neighborhoods, that is, by defining 
Y^(tut2) = 0 i f t , 4B,Yl2(tut2) =0 i f t 2 4 Bi, with the gains as pre-
viously defined if ti e B, t2 e Bi. 
It should be further noted that the selection of the margins of 
flexibility r, ri is conditioned by internal characteristics of the par-
ties. The margin of flexibility of a party basically depends on the 
dominant faction (reformists, opportunists, or militants) in each 
party. A majority of opportunists yields a larger valué for r because 
they care only about winning elections, not about ideology. How-
ever, a party with a majority of militants has less political flexibil-
ity because militants are more partisan and want policies as cióse 
as possible to the ideal policy of the party. 
The following section establishes the necessary or sufficient 
conditions for equilibrium in the proposed model. 
3. Equilibrium with restrictions 
3.1. Existence conditions 
Let us start by looking at a proposition that is essentially the 
translation of the definition of Nash equilibrium for the gains of 
the proposed game. 
Proposition 1. The equilibrium positions in the proposed game will 
be the positions (t-¡,t2) such that t^ is within the área of B of the 
máximum intersection of circles centered on a voter whose radius is 
the distance between the voter and t2 (Abellanas et al., 2006J and t2 
is also within the área ofBi of the máximum intersection. 
Proof. When q is located at t2, which is within the área of máxi-
mum vote gain when p is at ti, it can be seen that if q moves to 
t, then n 2 (ti, t) =? El2 (ti > Í2) and the same will happen with p. • 
Proposition 2 provides a sufficient condition for the positions 
(ti,t2) defined in the previous proposition to exist: 
Proposition 2. Letp^,... ,pnbe positions in the plañe ofthe n voters. 
Cali the points of the previous set p],...,p], so that d{p],B) 
< d{p],Bl). Then p2 ,...,p2 are the points which malee d{p2,B) > 
d{p2,Bl) true, and one may write the following expression: BJ = 
C(p¡., d(p¡, B'))p B, B2 = C(p2, d(p2 ,B))n B'. 
Then, if f] BJ ¥= <p and f] B2 ¥= <j>, any position (U,t2) with 
k J = 1 n /='<+! 
t-¡ e f] Bj, t2 e ("1 B¡ !S m equilibrium. 
Proof. In the positions noted, p beats the points p?, j = 1, . . . , k 
wherever q is within its neighborhood, and q beats the points 
pfj = k + 1, . . . , n wherever p is within its neighborhood. Then, if 
p moves, it cannot gain more than the k voters it has when q is 
in position t2, and the same situation exists for q; therefore, posi-
tion {t-¡,t2) is in equilibrium. • 
Remarks 
1. The previous result guarantees the existence of an infinite num-
ber of equilibrium positions for the cases described. This result 
contrasts with the uniqueness of the equilibrium positions, 
when they exist, in the usual definition of games without 
restrictions such as Downs' game. 
2. The given condition is not necessary for the existence of equilib-
rium; that is, there may be equilibrium positions without this 
condition. These possible cases are referred to in Section 3.3. 
3. To verify the condition established in Proposition 2, it is possible 
to use the geometric construction known as an arrangement of 
circles (de Berg et al., 1997). This arrangement can be constructed 
using a randomized incremental algorithm with expected run-
ning time 0(n2) (Edelsbrunner et al., 1992; Sharir and Agarwal, 
1995). When the circles that are part ofthe arrangement have a 
non-empty intersection, this condition will hold. Otherwise, 
information can be obtained about the área where the máximum 
number of voters can be secured for each party, wherever the 
other may be, by attaching a label to each cell of the arrangement 
that states the number of circles containing the cell. This can be 
done by means of a standard sweeping algorithm (Bentley and 
Ottmann, 1979) with running time 0(n2/ogn). 
4. In the case of equidistance between the positions of both par-
ties, the voter is assigned to the first one (see Section 2), and 
to guarantee that the position is in equilibrium, t2 should be 
inside f| B). 
j=k+l 
The following result presents a necessary condition regarding 
the gains so that a certain position may be in equilibrium. 
Because the gains are considered complementary, only the gain 
condition for the first party is considered. 
Proposition 3 . 1 / (ti,t2) is an equilibrium position, then 
l < n 1 (ti 1^ 2) < n -' '» where l is the máximum mtersection in B of 
C(pi,d(pi,Bt)) and 1/ is the máximum mtersection in Bi of 
C(pt,d(pt,B)),i=l,...,TL 
Proof. Let us suppose that there is an equilibrium position (U,t2) 
with f]1 (ti, t2) < /. Then locating p at a position t in the máximum 
intersection of the sets B? ensures a gain n 1 (t, t2) > l. This contra-
dicts the fact that (U,t2) is an equilibrium position. 
If n 1 (ti, t2) > n - /', then n 2 ( t i , t2) < /' (the gains are comple-
mentary); therefore, q can ensure a gain of // in a position ti in the 
máximum intersection of the sets BJ, thus improving its gain, which 
once more contradicts the fact that (ti, t2) is in equilibrium. • 
Remark. In the case where the sufficient conditions established in 
Proposition 2 are fulfilled, it is possible to verify that / + // = n, for 
which in the equilibrium positions (ti, t2), n 1 (ti , t2) = /.Proposition 
4 provides a sufficient condition for non-equilibrium, that is, 
another necessary equilibrium condition. 
Proposition 4. if for all t e B, there exist [§] + 1 points between 
Bl+i 
Pi , . . . ,pn,p,•, • • • ,p,„ , such that f| C(P(.,d(p¡.,t)) nB' ¥= <¡>, and the 
1 íl,+1 ;=i ' ' 
same pattern exists for all ti e Bi, then there are no equilibrium posi-
tions in the proposed game ([ ] stands for floor). 
Proof. If there were an equilibrium position (t, ti), then either 
fj1 (t, t') < § or n2( t , t') < \ would hold, because the gains are com-
plementary. If, for example, \^{t, t') < \, then for the position t of 
the first party in B, there are points p. , . . . ,p , such that 
[j+i ' ' ? + 1 
f| C{pj.,d{pj., t)) n B' ¥= <j>. Placing the second party in that intersec-
tion, there is a gain of at least [§] + 1 points í p^ , . . . ,pJR ], and 
therefore the gain increases, which is a contradiction because the 
position was in equilibrium. • 
This condition is not very practical because it is necessary to 
determine whether or not it holds for all points in neighborhoods B 
and Bi, and therefore it must be checked for an infinite number of 
points. Proposition 5 provides a more useful variation of this 
condition because it identifies regions of B (and 0ÍB1) which cannot 
be part of an equilibrium position, which limits the áreas which 
must be searched for equilibrium positions. 
Proposition 5. ifte B, and if there are n-l + í points in the set of 
n-l+1 
voters Pj ...,Pj_ , such that f] C(pj.,d(pj.,t)) nB' ¥= <j>, then no 
i=l 
n-l+1 o 
point ti e f| C(pj¡,d(pj.,t))c nB can be in an equilibrium position 
i=i 
(h,t2) (C is the interior of C and Ac the complementary set of A; l 
has the same definitxon as in Proposition 3). 
Proof. If there is an equilibrium position (ti,t2) with 
n-l+1 o 
ti e f| c(Pji,d(Pji,£:))cnB, then Yí(tut2) ¡ín-l as a conse-
i=i 
quence of Proposition 3.
 n )+1 o 
However, because ti is in f] C{pj.,d{pj.,t))c, this leads to 
¡=1 ' ' 
d(Pj,,h) > d(pj., t), and therefore C(pj.,d{p¡, ti)) D C(pj.,d{p¡, t)), so 
"n+ C(p i j ,d(p i j ,ti))nB'D"n C(p;.,d(j>;.,t))nB'*<t>. Placing the 
i=l n- l+1 i=l 
second party in f| C(Pj.,d(Pj.,ti)) nB' guarantees at least 
¡=1 
n-l + 1 voters, improving the gain, which is a contradiction 
because (ti,t2) was in equilibrium. • 
3.2. Non-uniqueness of equilibrium positions Proposition 6 proves 
the non-uniqueness of equilibrium positions when they exist. 
Proposition 6. If there is an equilibrium position (ti,t2) in the 
proposed game, then it is not unique. 
Proof. Assume that p¡x,... ,p¡ are the voters of ti and p,- ...,p¡ 
are the voters of t2. Then, because t2 is inside C{pj.,d{pj., ti)) for 
i = k + 1, . . . , n, it is possible to look for a position ti for the second 
party in Bi which is cióse enough to t2 for ti to be inside 
C{pj.,d{pj.,t-i)) for ¿ = fc + l , . . . , n and for ti to be inside 
C{pj., d{pj., t')) for i = 1 , . . . , fe, where this is the área in B of máxi-
mum gain when the second party is in ti. 
It then holds that {U,ti) is also an equilibrium position by 
Proposition 1. • 
3.3. Examples 
The model proposed here has the advantage that, as noted in 
Remark 1 of Proposition 2, there may be voter positions where 
there are an infinite number of equilibrium situations for the par-
ties. This enhances the possibilities of variation for the political 
positions of the rivals. Nevertheless, in this section, it will be seen 
that there are also examples with no equilibrium positions or with 
Fig. 1. Example of a situation with no equilibrium position. 
a unique equilibrium for one of the parties, a common characteris-
tic of political competition games without restrictions. 
Example 1. Examining the situation with the following initial 
positions of the political parties x0,Xi and the two voters 
P i ,p 2 :x 0 = (0,0), x 1 = ( 4 , 0 ) , P i=(0 ,3) , p2 = (0,-3), r = l , 
r '=f | , it holds that d(pi,B) = d(p2,B) = 2 < d(p^B") = d(p2,B") 
= !J¡ and that B\nBl = 4> (see Fig. 1); then the condition in 
Proposition 2 is not fulfilled. 
It can also be seen that, whenever C(pi,R) intersects with 
C(p2,S) forcertainR > d(pi,B/),S > d{p2,Bi) (so they can intersect 
with Bi), some point of the intersection lies in B. 
Then, for any position t2 of the second party in Bi, it can be seen 
that C(pi,d(pi, t2)) n C(p2,d(p2, t2)) has some point in B, because 
R = d(p,,t2) >d(pi,B/),S = d(p2,t2) >d{p2,Bi), and C(pi,d(pi, t2)) 
nC(p2,d(p2, t2)) 5^  <p (h is in the intersection). Then, locating the 
second party in some of these points of B, the two points of the set 
will be reached in that intersection, and then any position (ti,t2) 
with YV(h,t2) < 2 is not in equilibrium. However, if p[1(t1, t2) = 2, 
the position (ti,t2) is not in equilibrium either, because then 
n 2 ( t 1 ; t 2 ) = 0 . Therefore, because C(pi,d(pi, ti)) nfi/ ^ <j> or 
C{p2,d{p2, ti)) c\Bi ¥= <¡>, then if the second party is in 
C(pi,d(pi, ti)) c\Bi or in C(p2,d(p2, ti)) nB/, whichever is not 
empty, it will win either p, or p2 and improve its gain. Therefore, 
there is no equilibrium in this example. 
Example 2. Let us consider an example that does not fulfill the 
condition established in Proposition 2, and in which nevertheless 
there are an infinite numberof equilibrium positions, thus showing 
that the condition is not necessary: 
If x0 = (0,0), Xi = (3,0), pi = (3,9), p2 = (3, -9) , r = 1, r' = \, it 
occurs that: d(pi,B) = d(p2,B) = 3vTÜ - 1 < d(pi,B') = d(p2,B") 
= XL and that B\ <r\B\ = <p (see Fig. 2), and then the condition of 
Proposition 2 does not hold. 
If the second party is on Xi, and the first one in, for example, B] 
(see Fig. 3), then the first party certainly has p-,, and it cannot have 
Fig. 2. Example of infinite equilibrium positions which do not comply with a 
sufficient condition. 
9 1.10 
Fig. 3. Detail of the área B\ where the first party should be located. 
both by moving because C(pi, 9) n C(p2,9) = {xi} and Xi 4 B. Then, 
in these positions, each party has a voter (p2 is the payoff for the 
second party, with the first one being in B]: see Fig. 2), and neither 
party can improve its situation by moving, so the positions 
considered are equilibrium positions. 
Remark. In general, for any n > 2, there are examples of positions 
of n points where there is no equilibrium, or where there is equi-
librium without the sufficient condition being fulfilled. It is suffi-
cient to take n - 2 points whose máximum distance to B is less 
than the mínimum distance to Bi, such that B,1 = B for all those 
points and the other two points in the positions of the two previ-
ous examples (using the flexible neighborhoods for the two parties 
as defined in these examples). 
Fig. 4. Example of a unique position (not on the boundary of the neighborhood) for 
one of the two parties. 
Example 3. Let us consider an example where there is a unique 
equilibrium position for the first party and where there is no equi-
librium position in which both parties are at the boundary of their 
neighborhoods. This contrasts with the result of Abellanas et al. 
(2006), who showed that, for a fixed position of one of the parties, 
there is always a position for the other that maximizes its gain at 
the boundary limit of its neighborhood. If we take x0 = (0,0), 
x, = (V7,0), p, = (0,3), p2 = (0, -3) , r = TI = 1, it can be seen that 
d(p1,B) = d(p2 ,B)=2<d(p1 ,B/) = d(p2,B/) = 3 and BJnB2 = 
{x0} ¥= <j> ( s e e Fig. 4). In this example, the only equilibrium posi-
tions are (x0,ti) with ti e Bi, because they satisfy the condition in 
Proposition 2. Given that in any position (U,t2) with ti ¥= x0 and 
with rj1 (ti ,Í2) = 2, it will hold that, for example, d(p^ ,U) > 3, after 
locating the second party in B(pi,d(pi,ti)) nBi, it will win p^ and 
improve its gain. Therefore (U,t2) is not an equilibrium position. 
4. Conclusions 
There are a number of localization studies in the framework of 
the public economy that have addressed various problems using 
discrete or continuous approaches (Eisets et al., 1993; Ghosh and 
Harche, 1993; Hakimi, 1986, 1990; Mehrez and Stulman, 1982; 
Church, 1984). In the equilibrium analysis of most competitive 
multidimensional games, it has been found that equilibrium posi-
tions do not exist except for singular cases, so there exist no posi-
tions for the players that guarantee that the competitor cannot 
increase his gain by moving. 
In this paper, a discrete two-dimensional political competition 
model has been proposed and addressed using geometric strate-
gies that find the equilibrium positions if they exist. The most rel-
evant new aspect of the presented model is that it reflects the 
political reality of many countries, permitting the positions of the 
two major parties on certain topics of concern to vary to a certain 
extent to obtain a larger number of followers. This situation is 
common in regimes where the positions of the parties are not 
inflexible and they adapt to the preferences of the voters. The par-
ties are in effect looking for equilibrium positions within their flex-
ible neighborhoods. As established in Section 3, there are cases 
where the equilibrium positions that exist are not unique, but 
are regions in the plañe, that is, there are an infinite number of 
positions. This provides more possibilities for the game and con-
trasts with the results for unique equilibrium positions where both 
parties should adopt the same position. 
Although this research deals with a simplified model, this sim-
plification applies nowadays to a large number of countries where 
there are two major parties. 
The study of the existence and locations of equilibrium posi-
tions has been here given a wider scope by applying techniques 
from computational geometry, because of the discrete nature of 
the game as presented. 
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